and cultural substance of sovereignty beyond the state (Ruane and Todd 2001, p. 936) .
Thus, debordering the Irish border has involved constitutional ingenuity, reimagining state sovereignty and overcoming borders as barriers to mobility, contact, communication, cooperation and trade. It was bolstered by the eventual removal of the selective border security regime in the early 2000s.
The launch of the European Single Market in 1992 and the onset of the Irish Peace Process in 1994 meant that border customs posts and border security checkpoint instillations were surplus to requirements. Secondary roads were re-opened and militarised sections of the Irish border gradually became demilitarised through the dismantling of British Army mountain top watchtowers in South Armagh and the closure of heavily fortified security bases along the border (Nash, Reid and Graham, 2013, pp. 109-111) . The result is that the physical manifestation of the Irish border itself is hardly discernible save for a change in road markings and some 'Welcome to Northern Ireland' signs erected by the Northern Ireland Department of Regional Development in 2012, though many of these signs were removed, vandalised, defaced, or, in one instance, riddled with bulletholes 2 .
The continuing insurgent activity of small Irish republican splinter groups in the border region thereafter did little to disrupt the transformation of the Irish border from barrier to bridge. For example, in August 2009, one such group left a 300kg bomb outside Forkhill, County Armagh, running a concealed command wire across the border into County Louth. A telephone warning was given but a week passed before British security forces located the bomb. Upon the discovery the UK Government asserted that British troops would not be reintroduced to secure the Irish border 3 .
Since the Good Friday Agreement, police cooperation across the Irish border has thrived through informal networks and force-to-force agreements, though largely without overarching transparent regulatory and accountability structures and processes. Primarily, its focus has been on organised crime and the activities of continuing republican insurgents. 6 One example of this cooperation is the cross-border investigation into the murder of Paul
Quinn by a criminal gang south of the border in 2007. An Garda Siochána (Irish Police) and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officers operated as a team with Gardai conducting door-to-door enquiries in Northern Ireland (accompanied by PSNI personnel) while PSNI officers attended the interviews of suspects and witnesses in Ireland (Walsh, 2011) . Another example of organic cross-border cooperation involving police officers was the prolonged search in 2016 for the body of a young man believed to have drowned in the river Erne which traverses the Irish border. Police and burgeoning numbers of people from both sides of the border joined forces in the search which ended after two months when the body was found. In the intervening period, strong bonds of friendship were forged with one police officer commenting 'we saw these people realising that there is very little actually separating us' (Pollak, 2016) .
From the perspective of bodies with human faces, the benefits of debordering the Irish border cannot be over-estimated. The day-to-day cross-border mobility, contact, communication and cooperation among people has been beneficial to society, not least through its significance in supporting the Irish Peace Process, especially when unionistnationalist political disagreements impacted upon the functioning of the Good Friday Agreement institutions (McCall, 2011) .
Rebordering: Brexit
On the broader European and global fronts, the EU's debordering impulse of the 1990s was challenged by twenty-first century dramatisations that gave rise to increased perception of risks and threats from international terrorism and contested immigration. The EU response was to attempt to create the EU as a 'gated community'. It deploys sophisticated selection mechanisms which determine the entry of individuals, the aim being to protect European citizens from multifarious threats emanating from beyond the gates (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007, p. 303) . In the process, cross-border cooperation may be understood to have shifted from being a debordering dynamic towards a bordering one through the increased emphasis on border securitisation across the EU's external frontier (Andreas, 2003; Walters, 2006; McCall, 2014) . Thus, while the EU has 'sought to valorize transnational spaces through cross-border and inter-regional co-operation programmes' (Keating, 2012, p. 30) , its twentyfirst century emphasis on 'security' has translated into building an EU external frontier as a barrier against multifarious threats.
Borders remain the principal foci for securitising mobility (Amoore, 2006) . Indeed, many EU member states have attempted to take border matters into their own hands and secure their state borders in the face of contested immigration and terrorist attack. These attempts have been understood as performances in reasserting the authority of the state (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 175) . They confirm that debordering and rebordering are competing and overlapping processes in the EU (Amilhat Szary and Giraut 2015, p. 4).
The campaign for the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU -commonly referred to by the acronym 'Brexit' (from 'Britain's exit') -was invigorated by concerns, prejudices, fears and insecurities relating to the mobility of EU workers, as well as a media spotlight on contested immigration, in the contexts of a prolonged period of economic austerity and the EU's Mediterranean migration/refugee crisis which spiked in 2015.
The Brexit referendum campaign focused on the nexus between bordering and security. Its primary objective was to establish a hard security border regime in order to prevent the movement of unwanted outsiders to Britain, including those coming from within the EU, and thus remove an 'existential threat' to British identity (Buzan, 1993 (Waever, 1995) : 'the swarm' is the threat; hard security borders are the answer to that threat.
The wider issue of the post-2004 arrival of 'legitimate' mobile workers from Central Eastern
Europe is the prejudicial bedrock upon which this securitisation process is based. According to Cameron: '… the bigger issue today is migration from within the EU. Numbers that have increased faster than we in this country wanted … at a level that was too much for our communities, for our labour markets'.
7
According to Roger Liddle, the Brexit campaign was 'the remorseless logic of Conservative division on the European question' (Liddle, 2015, p. 5 border security regime is a sophisticated response to perceived threats emanating from
Outre-Mer and is largely focused on 'border portals' and 'choke points' -airports, ports and the Channel Tunnel. The Channel Tunnel is a particular point of interest for those concerned with bordering Britain to halt contested immigration. Unlike a land border, the Channel
Tunnel is a singular port of entry or 'choke point' through which all vehicles, goods and people have to pass and, as such, should present a relatively straight-forward site for the exercise of a security regime (Anderson with Bort, 2001, p. 184) . A greater challenge is patrolling the maritime borders around Britain, especially when it was revealed that the Border Force fleet numbered only five sea-worthy vessels 8 .
The British border security regime also involves activities in an electronic/intelligence cyberborder sphere, with nodes that extend to the European continent, and wherein the biometric passport -'the border in the pocket' -and the smartphone with GPS supersede many traditional functions of the human border guard (Häkli, 2015, p. 93 ).
Yet, Brexiters remained unimpressed by 'the border in the pocket' or by the fact that the UK border zone extends territorially to the European continent with UK border guards, replete with a formidable armoury of electronic border control paraphernalia -information databases, x-ray machines, electronic fingerprinters, body scanners, heat-seeking cameras, Post-Brexit, Ireland will continue as an EU member state and abide by its freedom of movement obligations. So it is, therefore, logical to assume that the Irish border will be the principal foci for the British Government's effort to 'bring back control'. However, this assumption is problematic, not least because the Irish border meanders for approximately 500km through towns, townlands, mountains, loughs, bogs, fields, farms and houses across the island of Ireland, has hundreds of crossing points, and was the subject of agitation and violence from its consolidation in 1925 until its reconfiguration from barrier to bridge in the 9 Gibraltar shares a land border with Spain. However, under the Treaty of Rome (1973) and the UK Act of Accession (1973) Gibraltar is classified as a dependent territory of the UK and not as a member of the UK. 10 Financial Times, 25 July 2016 25 July (accessed 28/07/2017 . 11 The EU, being a customs union, requires border customs posts to be established between the EU and nonmembers. This is the case between the EU and Norway which is the subject of the most advanced EU free trade agreement with a non-member state.
1990s. The island of Ireland has the densest cross-border road network in Europe (Leary, 2016) . Additionally, it is unruly: key arterial roads can cross the border more than once. For example, the direct route from Cavan Town (in Ireland) to Dungannon (in Northern Ireland), through the Drummully Salient, crosses the border no less than 5 times.
When the Northern Ireland 'Troubles' shifted from urban centres to the Irish border region in the 1980s British security forces had difficulty coping with local mobile Irish Republican Army (IRA) units whose members had an in-depth knowledge of the complex border terrain (Patterson, 2013) . Additionally, the border security regime was partial because the British Government recognised that a continuous securitised border would play into the hands of Irish republican insurgents since it would have risked further alienating the Irish nationalist population. In other words, the relative lack of border security was due to the fact that there was 'no political will at Westminster' for its imposition because of the concern that such a move would further stir political and militant Irish nationalism (Rose, 1983, p. 3).
With 'no political will at Westminster' to secure the Irish border at the height of the Northern Ireland 'Troubles', such an undertaking after Brexit would be a demonstration of abject political neglect. All the more so because the reconfiguration of the Irish border from barrier to bridge -through the removal of security checkpoints and customs posts, as well as the Good Friday Agreement's promotion of North South (Belfast-Dublin) and cross-border cooperation -has been an important element in British-Irish peacebuilding.
Conceivably, Brexit bordering could entail the reintroduction of customs, agri-food inspection and immigration checkpoints on cross-border arterial routes, the closure of hundreds of secondary cross-border roads (that were reopened in the 1990s courtesy of EU Interreg funding) 12 , and the establishment of a border security regime to support vulnerable customs and inspection officials and infrastructure.
Technology could be applied to the management of Irish border security. Devices such as motion sensors, scanners, infra-red and surveillance cameras, as well as migration databases could be deployed in that management. Indeed, the Legatum Institute -the 12 Such roads connect border cities, towns and villages including Derry, Strabane, Lifford, Pettigo, Belleek, Belcoo, Blacklion, Swanlinbar, Aghalane, Belturbet, Newtownbutler, Clones, Aughnacloy, Middletown, Dundalk and Newry.
influential Brexit 'think tank' in London -proposed the 'persistent surveillance of the border region' by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) after Brexit 13 (Singham et al, 2017, p. 28) .
However, to suggest that technology would render a post-Brexit Irish border 'invisible' is rejected by border technology experts (Taylor, 2017) . Without the human border guard, sensors, scanners, cameras and databases serve as little more than recording and counting devices of border crossings (Broeders, 2011, pp. 40-41) . Additionally, in the case of the unwieldy Irish border, technological infrastructure on cross-border roads would be no less vulnerable to destruction than 'Welcome to Northern Ireland' signs unless it was protected by human border patrols. 14 Irish Times, 11 April 2016. At http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-could-lead-toirish-border-controls-tories-warn-1.2605627 (accessed 22/08/2016).
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Option 2: Bordering Britain
Arguably, the Irish border that was made manifest between 1921 and 1925 was an imperial frontier because it was imposed by the British Empire in retreat (Anderson and O'Dowd, 2005) . Eventually, the border began to resemble a state border through the UK shift from This did not mean that the common travel area was insulated from higher security concerns.
In response to security threats 'bordering Britain' was triggered without a qualm. Britain is the de facto state and its borders are 'fuzzy' (Rose, 1983, pp. 31-2) .
A Brexit quest to secure borders and identify and exclude unwanted outsiders raises the issue of whether Ireland is to be regarded as a 'foreign country'. If the answer is 'yes' then the continued existence of the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland is called into question. However, a Brexit border security regime may also exclude Northern Ireland given the economic expense, practical difficulties and political risks involved in attempting to secure the Irish border. In a Brexit bordered Britain passengers travelling from the Ireland to Britain would be required to produce some form of identification at ports and airports in order to be processed in the British border control system and gain entry into Britain.
given the porous nature of the Irish border.
This would mean that Britain's border portals (at ports and airports) would become the foci for Brexit securitisation. The requirement to produce a form of identification other than a passport at a Britain's border security portal checkpoints would help to soothe Ulster British national identity sensitivities. Brexit's totemic 'bring back control' of immigration and the disbarment of unwanted outsiders from Britain indicates that the performance of such checks would have to take place at Britain's border portals in any case. Passing the burden of immigration restriction wholly to employers, landlords and the education sector is unlikely to satisfy the controlling urges of Brexiters.
This 'Bordering Britain' option is attractive on 3 counts: firstly, it would honour a crossborder, cross-community democratic wish articulated in the oft repeated refrain in the political domain, namely, 'no one wants to see a hard border' on island of Ireland;
secondly,it would be practically easier and economically less costly to establish and manage;
and thirdly, it would avoid the risk of a return to the violence associated with a hard Irish border, as noted by the PSNI's Deputy Chief Constable 18 ; . As Kapka Kassabova accurately observes, 'an actively policed border is always aggressive: it is where power suddenly acquires a body, if not a human face, and an ideology' (2017, p. xvi). In the case of the Irish border, bordering requires bodies with (concealed) human faces that would re-dramatise the conflicting British and Irish nationalist ideologies that two decades of debordering have helped to ameliorate.
The logic of Brexit is that Britain's borders may well retreat to Britain, and possibly to England and Wales thereafter, in the quest to render them, clear, secure, and impenetrable to unwanted outsiders. Such bordering would reflect the British national imagination.
Though the Scottish imagined community may demur, the British national imagination has the borders of the UK fixed firmly on Britain -This Sceptred Isle. Political psychologists have found that, in the British context, 'allusions to the geographical boundaries of imagined community [the island] may be used as a substitute for reference to the common and distinctive character or "identity" of the population' (Abell, Condor and Stevenson, 2006) .
'This Sceptred Isle' and the 'White Cliffs of Dover' pervade heroic, romantic and (banal) nationalist readings of British history (Billig, 1995) . Popular television and radio programmes such as the ten-week BBC Radio 4 series This Sceptred Isle, the long-running BBC comedy Britain through its ports and airports remained beyond the pale of these negotiations, even though freedom of movement of EU workers was a key driver of Brexit.
Option 3: Bordering the Isles of Britain and Ireland
As the operation of the Common Travel Area testifies, a high level of cooperation and information-sharing between the UK and Irish electronic border control systems is evident and could form the basis for the development of a hard border around the isles of Britain (Garry, 2017) . There have also been a number of Irish scholarly interventions on the subject. See, for example, Kilcourse, 2013; O'Ceallaigh and Kilcourse, 2013; and O'Ceallaigh and Gillespie, 2015. more powerful neighbour. On the possibility of an Irexit a former Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) commented: 'we're mad, but we're not that mad' 24 .
Conclusion
During the Northern Ireland 'Troubles' the political risks of a continuous and 'seamless' (in the security barrier sense) Irish border were recognised by the British Government. That border has undergone a twenty year reconfiguration -driven by Europeanisation, the North South provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, and an avalance of cross-border cooperation initiatives -that has rendered it open and free flowing for unhindered mobility, contact, communication, cooperation and trade.
The Brexit campaign was primarily concerned with 'bringing back control' of the movement of unwanted 'outsiders' to Britain, including EU citizens from mainland Europe. Bordering is the principal mechanism for asserting such control. Therefore, the key Brexit question is:
Where to implement bordering? This paper has explored three options: bordering the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; bordering Britain; and bordering the isles of Britain and Ireland.
In the context of the Irish border Brexit raised the possibility of border checkpoints on main arterial routes, hundreds of secondary cross-border road closures, and mobile border security patrols to control the movement of people and goods across it. However, the economic cost, practical difficulties and political risks in doing so mean that other options are worthy of exploration. An alternative option would be to hard border the isles of Britain and Ireland. Heretofore, the Irish Government has followed the UK Government on justice and home affairs issues. 
